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Abstract
The increasing attention to environmental damage and the prob-
lem of climate changes have led many studies to concentrate on envi-
ronmental taxation as an incentive-based instrument of environmen-
tal policy. Focusing on the relationship among environmental, labour
market policies and institutional sectors, this paper aims to investi-
gate the economic eﬀects of a ﬁscal reform designed with the intent
of reducing the Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, according to Kyoto
Protocol. For this purpose, a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)
model is used with imperfection market for labour factor and a green
tax on commodity output depending on the level of CO2 emission is
introduced. Tax revenues are than completely distributed to the econ-
omy in order to reduce the income tax or to cut the regional tax on
commodity value added. In this way a revenue-neutral environmental
policy is tested and the double dividend and any other eﬀect on na-
tional economy are assessed. The application will be done on a Social
Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Italy for the 2003 year
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1 Introduction
In recent years environmental sustainability has been representing an im-
portant economic policy objective for European countries as a consequence
of the strong awareness for climate changes and the ensuing environmen-
tal damage. Environmental policies generally consist on a set of measures
such as tax penalties, subsidies and incentives oriented to improve eﬃciency
on energy consumption and reduce ineﬃcient behaviours. The use of such
instruments, aimed to reduce the amount of emissions and promote environ-
mental conservation according to international agreements, in some cases is
still discouraged by politicians and governments which interpret this mea-
sures as burdens to economies.
The debate around the implementation of an environmental policy and
the property of the instruments involved, mostly concerns the diﬃculties
to asses their impact in terms of environmental development and economic
growth. To be more speciﬁc, diﬀerences among the methodologies used for
the environmental economic evaluation and the eﬀectiveness of the environ-
mental instruments in terms of competitiveness obstruct their appliance. In
this respect it seems to be crucial ﬁnding out real economic paybacks embod-
ied with environmental beneﬁts. Furthermore the environmental taxation is
the most disputed reform within the set of measures against environmental
damage and his proﬁtability is usually connected with the evaluation of a
double or triple dividend. If we accept to deﬁne the environmental devel-
opment, for example the reduction of emissions, as the ﬁrst dividend, it is
evident that the adoption of environmental taxation should be sustained by
the research of a second or a third dividend.
For this purpose the paper aims to evaluate the double/triple dividend
hypothesis by adopting a speciﬁc environmental policy for the Italian eco-
nomic system, using a CGE model based on a 2003 Social Accounting Matrix
(SAM). The environmental data set concerning Green House Gas (GHG)
emissions by commodities in physical terms allows to ﬁnd the convenient tax
reform environmentally oriented for the Italian economy. In particular an
eﬀort is made to evaluate the double/triple dividend hypothesis by adopt-
ing a speciﬁc environmental tax policy that consists in the eco-tax on CO2
emissions by Italian commodities designed with two diﬀerent scenarios of
application.
In this respect, section 2 shows the methodological arguments on environ-
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mental taxation. Section 3 discusses the static General Equilibrium model
used. In Section 4 the scenarios of the progressive and proportional environ-
mental tax proposal for the Italian system are described. The section shows
also the results of the application for the Italian case in term of environmental
improvement, changes in prices of commodities and primary factors, in total
output, unemployment rate and income distribution between Institutional
Sectors.
2 Eﬃciency and methodological arguments on environmental tax-
ation
Environmental taxation is one of the incentive-based instruments of environ-
mental policy widely promoted by economists to deal with the problem of
climate changes and environmental depleting and degrading. Environmental
taxes, also known as “green” or “eco” taxes, should be carefully designed in
order to internalize external costs and ensure that prices reﬂect all social costs
of production, including environmental costs (Pigou 1932). In this way it is
possible to discourage polluting activities without neglecting the economic
growth.
The main aspects of environmental taxation that are strongly debated in
current literature, refer both to the methodology used for the environmental
economic evaluation and the eﬀectiveness of the environmental policy.
The economic assessment of the environmental costs is made complex
by the mismatching between the environmental criteria and the traditional
accounting scheme. The general System of National Accounts (SNA) con-
cepts of cost, capital formation and stock of capital should be integrated
with additional data in physical terms in order to incorporate environmental
cost and the use of natural assets in production or, in alternative, amended
through the incorporation of these eﬀects in monetary terms (United Nations
1994). Notwithstanding the general agreement on this orientation, the ex-
isting approaches diﬀer considerably in terms of methodology. The System
of Environmental Economic Accounts (SEEA) suggests one comprehensive
approach that integrates and synthesizes as far as possible all the others. It
identiﬁes two types of environmental costs, for degradation an depletion and
for environmental protection, and introduces an enlarged concept of capital
accumulation which include the reduction in the capital stock, as a result of
depletion and degradation, and the transfer of natural assets between eco-
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nomic uses, as a result of production decisions. This criteria permits to
derive an Environmentally adjusted net Domestic Product (EDP) which is
lower than Net Domestic Product (NDP). Even though this new aggregate
can be considered as the benchmark for environmental policies, much caution
should be exercised in the derivation of environmentally adjusted aggregates
especially when the valuations are made in monetary terms.
In this respect the European Commission suggests the employ of the
National Accounting Matrix including Environmental Accounts (NAMEA) as
basic tool for the integration between environmental and economic ﬂows. The
NAMEA supplements the major economic aggregates - total output, value
added and ﬁnal demand - with the GHG emissions data in physical terms
according to the input output disaggregation (CE 1994). This approach
avoids the diﬃculties connected to the valuation of environmental costs and
assets in monetary terms.
As for the problem of the eﬀectiveness of the environmental policies, it
has to be stressed that it represents a complex aspect with more than a few
features that cannot be fully treated here. Generally it is known that envi-
ronmental taxation attracts strong opposition because it is likely to impose
further burdens on economies and may have distortional eﬀect on the con-
sumption: the change in the relative price of goods and services caused by the
introduction of an environmental tax on pollutant commodities, can modiﬁed
consumers’ choices (Panella 2002). Nevertheless environmental taxation is a
powerful instrument because it gives the government the possibility to col-
lect revenue and discourage ineﬃcient behaviours. The additional revenues
can be used by the government to ﬁnance the reduction in pre-existing dis-
tortive taxes in order to achieve a more than a singular beneﬁt, also known
in literature as dividends (Pearce 1991).
2.1 The double dividend hypothesis
The possibility for the government to collect revenue from environmental tax-
ation is the main reason making this kind of taxation proﬁtable: by recycling
this revenue in fact, it is possible to achieve a double dividend. Following this
hypothesis, the introduction of emission regulations not only improves envi-
ronmental quality, that can be deﬁned as the ﬁrst dividend, but also increases
the eﬃciency of tax system reaching the so called second dividend.
It is worth distinguishing between an economic welfare and an employ-
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ment second dividend. An economic welfare second dividend arises because
the tax change reduces the distortions in consumer choices and then increases
welfare. On the contrary an employment double dividend would claim a re-
duction in unemployment if payroll and similar taxes are reduced. In both
two cases, the evidence of the second dividend strictly depends on how dis-
torted the existing tax system is. The economic literature on European
economy has mostly focused on the interaction between environmental and
labour market policies, as a consequence of growing unemployment rates, in
order to achieve the reduction of polluting emissions and get an employment
second dividend.
The distortionary eﬀect of increasing green taxes above the level at which
the marginal pollution damage is internalized, should be compared to the ef-
ﬁciency gains from reducing other taxes. The stepping stone on this analysis
is represented by a preliminary theoretical paper based on a CGE model
where the markets are all competitive and the labour is the only production
factor used (Bovenberg and De Mooij 1994). The results show that envi-
ronmental tax not only distorts the labour market, but also the commodity
market. In conclusion, even if the environmental quality improves, the eﬃ-
ciency dividend does not materialize. In literature it is commonly accepted
the distinction between weak and strong double dividend hypothesis (Goul-
der 1995a). The weak hypothesis refers to the possibility to get better results
if the tax revenue is used to reduce distortionary taxes rather than provide
lump-sum payments. The strong double dividend imply the reduction of
distortionary costs connected to the introduction of the environmental tax.
While the weak form of dividend has been widely assessed, there is no
consensus on the strong double dividend hypothesis1. However the rigidity
on wages formation and the existence of involuntary unemployment, encour-
aged to ﬁnd an empirical proof of a strong form of double dividend. Many
empirical studies such as Schneider (1997), Bovenberg and De Mooij (1998),
Bovenberg and Goulder (2002), Takeda (2007) introduce more factors of
production and strategic behaviour on the labour market, e.g. involuntary
unemployment. They proved that the hypothesis of strong double dividend
can be veriﬁed under some conditions such as:
 pre-existing distortionary factor taxes;
1Empirical studies after Bovenberg, Goulder (1995b), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996),
Bovenberg and Goulder (1997) and Bohringer et al. (1997), reached the conclusion that
the double dividend does not arise.
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 the taxation of factors that are inelastically supplied and relatively un-
der taxed;
 the relative internationally immobility of capital;
 the elasticity of substitution between energy (the environmental input)
and labour greater than elasticity of substitution between energy and
capital;
 the real wages rise little when unemployment falls, so that the reduction
in taxes on labour are not oﬀset by wage rises.
The possibility to get a double dividend through an environmental policy
seems to be much more realistic than expected if speciﬁc distortions and eco-
nomic conditions of the system studied are taken into account. Later studies
demonstrated the possibility to reach a triple dividend. It is represented by
decreasing emissions, increasing GDP and decreasing poverty (Van Heerden
et al. 2006), or by reducing CO2 emissions, increasing employment levels
and a better eﬃciency of tax system (Manresa and Sancho 2005).
3 The model structure
The analysis of the impacts of an environmental tax reform requests a proper
full detailed accounting scheme that is represented by the bi-regional Social
Accounting Matrix (SAM). This disaggregated data base allows to implement
a Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) model that is a suitable tool
to investigate the economic implications of an exogenous shock when prices
change. The model, in fact, can capture the distributional consequences of a
ﬁscal policy simulation whose eﬀects are transmitted to macroeconomic vari-
ables (employment rate, GDP change) and allows to know how the policy
aﬀects the income distribution between Institutional Sectors. A prominent
advantage of our CGE model lies in the possibility of combining detailed and
consistent real-world database, the SAM, with environmental data concern-
ing GHG emissions in order to verify the hypothesis of double dividend.
The model is of static bi-regional general equilibrium type and considers
an open economy with two regions2, m regional commodities, c component of
value added (labour and capital), h Institutional Sectors with a foreign sector
that closes the model. It can be described as an integrated representation of
the bi-regional income circular ﬂow where the entire process of creation and
2The region s (South) and the region n (North-Centre).
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distribution of income is described by a system of behavioural equations and
income constrains for agents (that are all maximisers and price takers). The
model can be described by a coordinated set of matrices of ﬂows that take
place according to the relationship among the principal economic functions
such as production, consumption, redistribution and accumulation by the
agents represented.
The model is solved through a walrasian equilibrium solution except for
the labour market equilibrium that admits a positive rate of unemployment,
u. The solution is described by a vector of ﬁnal commodity prices, that ver-
iﬁes the market clearing conditions for all commodities, and by a vector of
factors prices. The total output (X), that is the combination of domestic
and imported outputs3, equals the intermediate demand (Bri), the private
consumption (Cri), the local and central government spending for public con-
sumption (GLri, Gri), the gross capital formation (I) and the trade balance
with the rest of the world (Erw , Mrw) with r = n, s and i = 1,..., m.
The market clearing conditions for the factors are veriﬁed when the fac-
tors endowment corresponds to the factors demand expressed by the pro-
duction system. In this respect it is worth to put into evidence the mar-
ket imperfection for labour factor represented by initial positive involuntary
unemployment rate, u. Our model distinguishes two types of workers, self-
employed and employed and introduces a Labour Union that has a monopoly
power and a neutral risk utility function. The negotiation over wages between
Firms and Labour Union is modelled as a “right-to-manage” Nash bargaining.
The parties bargain only over employed wages and Firms decide over their
employed demand at the bargained wage (Bohringer et al. 2005). Instead
the market for capital and self-employment factors are perfectly competitive.
The balance constrains refer to Institutional Sectors that are distinguished
in private sectors (Households and Firms) and public sectors (Central Public
Administration and Local Administrations) and are veriﬁed for private sec-
tors when the total disposal income by sector equals the total expense for
saving and consumption. As for public sectors the total government spend-
ing (GLrr, Grg, Trrr, Trg, Trwr) equals the total tax collection (Tg, Trr,
Twr). Finally the condition on gross capital formation requests that total
investments (Ir) equal savings by all Institutional Sectors, (Sr and Sg).
3Following the Armington’s hypothesis (1969), imported and domestically produced
commodities are not perfect substitutes. This solves the problem that the same kind of
good is found to be both exported and imported.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9Ciaschini, Pretaroli, Severini, Socci/ WP n.25 DiSSE, University of Macerata
Starting from the production function, the activities produce an homo-
geneous good using a nested constant return to scale technology. In the ﬁrst
step the function is characterized by ﬁxed coeﬃcients and the elasticity of
substitution is diﬀerent by each commodity4. Thus, assuming the Leontief
production function, the domestic output derives from the combination of in-
termediate goods, depending on total output and prices, and the value added
aggregate that is aﬀected by total production and factors prices (Yrr). Then
assuming a CES function, the aggregate value added is generated by com-
bining capital and labour that are perfectly mobile across sectors and the
elasticity of substitution derives from econometric estimates for Italy (Van
der Werf 2007).
In the behavioural side, we point out that the remuneration of primary
factors (Yrr) plus net transfers from institutional sectors (Trrr , Trrg, Trwr)
represent total endowments (Rrr, Rrg). The utility function of all institu-
tional sectors is treated as if it was a production function of a composite good
“wealth” whose inputs are consumptions (Crr, GLrr, Grg), savings (Srr, Sg)5,
transfers to other institutional sectors. Therefore the consumption plans are
the result of solving the Cobb-Douglas utility function subjected to a budget
constraint represented by net endowments. This fact ensures that the shares
of commodities consumed, savings and transfers remain unchanged in terms
of quantity in all simulations.
The government expenditure is given by the production of a public con-
sumption good, public investments and transfers to Households, Firms and
other public sectors. It is ﬁnanced through taxes, public savings and trans-
fers, including the Rest of the World. Taxes can be divided into direct income
tax and a set of diﬀerent indirect taxes (production tax, value-added tax and
labour tax). The foreign sector utility function closes the model.
4 Progressive and proportional Environmental Tax proposal
The simulations aim to verify the double dividend hypothesis for the Italian
economy by measuring the impact of a the new environmental tax on the
4The elasticity of substitution is calculated by each commodity considering the data on
international commerce from the Economic and Financial Planning Document for 2004-
2007 as the ratio between the percentage change in net imports and the percentage change
in exchange rate.
5In our model the savings follow a kaldorian hypothesis according which Households
have a lower saving propensity than Firms and consume a share of their income.
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macro variables. The exogenous shock on tax system is introduced with a
new environmental tax on commodity output with a progressive structure
in which the rate paid by each commodity rises when the amount of CO2
emissions rises.
The Kyoto protocol ﬁxed the objective on GHG for the Italian economy
in the reduction of 5.5% of CO2 emissions for the period of 2008-20126.
Starting from the year 1990, when the national CO2 emissions were 360
Mlt, the Italian system should have reduced them of around 0.897 Mlt in
each followed year in order to achieve the Kyoto target represented by 340
Mlt of CO2 in the year 2012 (ISTAT 2008)7. In the year 2003, we can see
that the Italian CO2 emissions were 118 basic points, 39 Mlt more than the
annual target. The diﬀerence can be easily interpreted as the Italian debit of
CO2 emissions8 while 348 Mlt represent the admitted level of CO2 emissions
that we interpreted as the exemption for the commodities according to their
coeﬃcient of CO2 emission (ISTAT 2008).
The simulations implemented concern the introduction of an environmen-
tal tax on commodity output diﬀerentiated according to CO2 emissions. For
this purpose we introduce a “no-tax area” represented by the level of CO2
emissions permitted to Italy in order to reach Kyoto Protocol target. The
goods charged by the taxation burden are those with CO2 emissions higher
than the top level of 10.8 Mlt as shown in ﬁg.1.
The exemption area is calculated as the ratio between the total level
of CO2 allowed for Italy for 20039, and the number of commodities in the
benchmark10. In this way less polluting commodities are not taxed and those
commodities which over-pass the permitted level (10.8 Mlt for each commod-
ity) have an incentive to reduce their emissions to avoid the taxation. The
tax is designed with a both progressive and proportional structure: there are
5 Classes of taxation and every commodity pays a ﬁxed price per ton of CO2
6Since the Kyoto protocol established the reduction of 6.5% of Italian GHG, that are
represented by CO2 for the 85%, the Kyoto target for Italian CO2 is around 5.5%.
7We consider the emission of CO2 by commodities and not by families.
8If we interpret the reduction path as a linear decreasing function we can ﬁnd the
distance from the Kyoto target on CO2 emissions that is 6.72 basic points.
9The emissions foreseen for Italy for 2003 by the path of emission reduction to achieve
within 2012 a reduction of 5.5% of CO2 emissions with respect to 1990 levels are 348 Mlt.
10The commodities number is 32 (16 for North-Centre area and 16 for South area).
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Table 2: Distance from the Kyoto target and the Italian debt of CO2 emis-
sions
Emission of CO2 by commodities (1990 = base, Mlt) 360
Kyoto target on Greenhouse emission (%) -6.5
Kyoto target on CO2 emission by commodities (%) -5.5
CO2 emissions objective for year 2003 (Mlt) 348
Level of CO2 emissions for year 2003 (Mlt) 387
Debt of Emission of CO2 for the 2003 (Mlt) 39
CO2 emissions objective for year 2012 (basic points) 97
CO2 emissions for year 2003 (basic points) 118
Distance from the Kyoto target (basic points) 6.72
emission. The higher is the class, the higher is the burden eﬀorted by the
commodity. The structure of this eco-tax can be described as follow:
 Class 0. from 0 to 10.871.958 t: no-tax area,
 Class 1. from 10.871.959 t to 15.000.000 t: 9 euro per CO2 t,
 Class 2. from 15.000.001 t to 30.000.000 t: 16 euro per CO2 t,
 Class 3. from 30.000.001 t to 50.000.000 t: 22 euro per CO2 t,
 Class 4. over 50.000.001 t: 32 euro per CO2 t.
In North-Center region, the commodities which pay the eco-tax on output
are: ‘Energy products’ (Class 4), ‘Non metallic mineral products’ (Class 3),
‘Chemical products’ (Class 3), ‘Mechanics’ (Class 2), ‘Trade’ (Class 1) and
‘Transport’ (Class 1). In South region, ‘Energy products’ (Class 4) and ‘Non
metallic mineral products’ (Class 1).
The policies aim to promote the reduction in polluting goods consumption
in order to cut CO2 emissions and reach the ﬁrst dividend (environmental
dividend). Moreover, since the economic system is integrated and all vari-
ables are connected, it is crucial to evaluate the policies eﬀects on the whole
income circular ﬂow and on unemployment rate in order to assess the exis-
tence of a second (or even a third) dividend for the Italian economy. For this
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purpose, the policies implemented are revenue-neutral, so the tax revenue is
completely recycled following two hypothesis:
 in the ﬁrst scenario s1 the tax revenue is recycled to reduce Households
income tax;
 in the second scenario s2 the tax revenue is recycled to cut the regional
tax on commodities value added;
The rationale for this recycling schemes lies on the political sensitive
on progressive direct taxes (income taxes) reduction as an instrument to
increase Households endowments and sustain ﬁnal demand. On the other side
the regional tax on commodities value added has been surrounded by many
controversies and objection particularly on its legality since its introduction.
4.1 Simulation results: the Italian case
The analysis is carried out on the Italian SAM for 2003 (Pretaroli and Socci
2008), which represents the production system features and the circular in-
come ﬂow for the whole economy, in terms of intra-regional and inter-regional
ﬂows. A set of rows and columns of the SAM are headed to 16 commodities
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and 9 Institutional Sectors11 in each region. The rows and columns of Cen-
tral Government, the Rest of the World and the Capital Formation, that all
have national relevance, close the accounting scheme.
The CGE model requires a disaggregation of Institutional Sectors ﬂows in
order to distinguish diﬀerent type of revenues and expenditures. These details
are requested mainly for Government sectors ﬂows in order to introduce the
implementation of various ﬁscal policies straightforward. The introduction
of an eco-tax on commodity output levied according to the CO2 emission
capacity of each production process in proportional and progressive terms,
impacts in all phases of the income circular ﬂow12. In this respect, the
simulation results are described following this framework.
a) Production: prices and outputs
In both two scenarios the eco-tax is imposed on total output. In particular
the burden is on the commodities whose CO2 emissions exceed the allowed
(no-taxed) level. Focusing on the impacts on prices, it is evident the attempt
of the commodities involved by the policy to translate the tax burden on
prices. As shown in the table 3, almost all prices increase in both regions in
every scenario with some exceptions.
When the tax revenue is recycled to reduce Households income tax (s1)
the prices of ‘Energy products’ and ‘Non metallic mineral products’ rise more
than all the other commodities in both two regions, with an increase of
3.667% in the South and 5.605% in the North-Centre. These production
processes in fact are relatively the most pollutant and pay relatively higher
tax rate. Despite of this trend some commodities as ‘Trade’ and ‘Private
services’ in North-Centre region and ‘Financial services and Insurance’ in
both two regions, detect a decrease in prices.
In the second scenario s2 the environmental tax revenue is recycled to cut
the regional tax on commodities value added. The results showed in table
3 conﬁrm a general increase in most commodities price, but the changes ob-
served are smaller than in previous scenario. As expected, the tax burden
is higher on the most polluting commodities in both regions (‘Energy prod-
ucts’, ‘Non metallic mineral products’ and ‘Chemical products’) but many
11I.Households, II.Firms, III.Regional Government, IV.District Government, VI.-
IX.Municipal Government.
12The results are of direct and indirect type and are expressed as percentage changes
from the benchmark that is the economy represented by the SAM.
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Table 3: Impacts on commodity prices (% change)
Commodity South North-Centre
s1 s2 s1 s2
1. Products of agriculture 0.123 0.108 0.097 0.102
2. Energy products 3.667 3.662 5.605 5.615
3. Metal and non metal ore 0.151 0.066 0.267 0.230
4. Non metallic mineral products 0.312 0.281 1.471 1.462
5. Chemical products 0.198 0.142 0.780 0.760
6. Mechanics 0.069 0.018 0.215 0.207
7. Transport equipment 0.081 0.045 0.136 0.129
8. Food products and beverages 0.140 0.111 0.186 0.177
9. Textile 0.039 -0.012 0.066 0.059
10. Other manufacturing products 0.109 0.037 0.161 0.143
11. Construction work 0.020 -0.012 0.113 0.107
12. Trade 0.024 -0.001 -0.032 -0.032
13. Transport 0.217 0.188 0.135 0.125
14. Financial services and Insurance -0.113 -0.161 -0.110 -0.135
15. Private services 0.151 0.133 -0.230 -0.218
16. Government services 0.150 0.095 0.094 0.051
reduction on prices are also observed: ‘Textile’, ‘Construction work’, ‘Trade’
and ‘Financial services and Insurance’ in South and ‘Trade’, ‘Financial ser-
vices and Insurance’ and ‘Private services’ in North. This is probably caused
by the reduction of the distortive regional tax on commodities value added
that more than compensate the environmental taxation.
According to the results showed on table 4, the introduction of an envi-
ronmental tax with progressive and proportional structure causes a general
reduction on disaggregate output in both two regions in each scenario13. The
percentage changes are included in -0.7% in both scenarios with the exception
for the ‘Energy products’. This commodity registers an output reduction of
2.054% in South and 1.707% in North-Centre in s1 and -2.066% in South and
-1.712% in North-Centre in s2.
13The only exception is represented by the commodity ‘Government services’ in North-
Centre region which registers an increase of 0.044%.
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Table 4: Impacts on output levels (% change)
Commodity South North-Centre
s1 s2 s1 s2
1. Products of agriculture -0.187 -0.194 -0.219 -0.222
2. Energy products -2.054 -2.066 -1.707 -1.712
3. Metal and non metal ore -0.294 -0.276 -0.299 -0.286
4. Non metallic mineral products -0.361 -0.355 -0.704 -0.699
5. Chemical products -0.245 -0.222 -0.587 -0.578
6. Mechanics -0.327 -0.319 -0.307 -0.302
7. Transport equipment -0.213 -0.204 -0.258 -0.253
8. Food products and beverages -0.183 -0.184 -0.268 -0.265
9. Textiles -0.099 -0.075 -0.152 -0.149
10. Other manufacturing products -0.198 -0.171 -0.235 -0.226
11. Construction work -0.382 -0.377 -0.346 -0.346
12. Trade -0.111 -0.114 -0.149 -0.150
13. Transport -0.25 -0.249 -0.265 -0.262
14. Financial services and Insurance -0.222 -0.229 -0.216 -0.221
15. Private services -0.197 -0.206 -0.062 -0.071
16. Government services -0.011 -0.066 0.044 -0.022
Total Output Change -0.314 -0.324 -0.268 -0.273
Along the same scenario the diﬀerences in output changes between the
two regions are the consequences of the more or less burden imposed by the
environmental taxation on the economy. In North-Centre region the ‘Chem-
ical products’ is one of the most penalized while in the South the same com-
modity has a relatively small reduction in production. The reasons for these
diﬀerences are associated with the structure of the taxation which is mod-
elled in order to charge most polluting commodities that are concentrated in
North-Centre region.
As a consequence of this production reduction, the aggregate output de-
creases with a higher percentage in South in the second scenario than in the
ﬁrst. This means that at least in aggregate terms, the reduction of the re-
gional tax on commodities value added with by recycling the eco-tax revenue
(scenario s2), does not compensate the burden imposed by the policy. But
in disaggregate terms this compensation occurs for many commodities with
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Total Italy -0.898 -0.900
exception of ‘Agriculture’ ‘Energy products’, ‘Trade’, ‘Financial services and
Insurance’, ‘Private services’ and ‘Government services’.
b) Environmental aspects
The environmental policy applied generates the expected impacts on CO2
emissions thus it is possible to conﬁrm the presence of the ﬁrst dividend
(better environmental quality) in both two scenarios. An environmental tax
on output, levied according to the emissions generated by the production of
each commodity, with a proportional and progressive structure, reduces the
level of CO2 emissions as shown in table 5.
The best results in terms of reduction are performed by the South re-
gion in both two scenarios. This depends on the policy eﬀects on output
as illustrated in table 4. Comparing these results with those on emissions,
the reasons for which the second scenario reaches better results are evident.
When the compensation of the environmental tax passes through a reduc-
tion of the regional tax on commodities value added (s2), the total output
decreases more than the other scenario and than the level of emissions di-
minishes according the same path.
c) Value added generation and assignment: nominal aspects and unem-
ployment rate
The consequences of introducing an environmental tax reﬂect on value added
generation and distribution. In particular the analysis concentrates on pri-
mary factors prices changes (Employed, Self Employed and Capital income)
and on unemployment rate. The table 6 illustrates interesting diﬀerences in
the results among regions and scenarios. Starting from the ﬁrst scenario s1,
primary factors payments decrease as a whole in North-Centre region while
in South “employed” labour payment raises. This trend is persistent also in
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Table 6: Impacts on primary factors payments and unemployment (%
change)
Primary Factors South North-Centre
s1 s2 s1 s2
Employed 0.043 0.025 -0.075 -0.040
Self Employed -0.087 -0.069 -0.201 -0.156
Capital -0.458 -0.437 -0.486 -0.439
Unemployment rate % change 0.111 0.093 -0.059 -0.028
Unemployment rate 17.75 17.68 4.60 4.56
s2 but the changes are lower.
According to the exigencies of our research, the most attractive result of
these simulations is related to the unemployment rate change. The environ-
mental policy in fact is implemented in order to assess the double dividend
hypothesis for Italian economy. Once the ﬁrst dividend has been veriﬁed, the
aim of the computational exercise is ﬁnding out the second dividend that can
be interpreted as lower unemployment rate. This assumption is veriﬁed in the
North-Centre region in both two scenarios. The table 6 shows a reduction of
unemployment rate of 0.059% in s1 and 0.028% in s2. On the other side, the
level of employment in South region decreases. This result is related to the
speciﬁc hypothesis on the labour market structure14 and to the production
dampen for this area. As for of the tax revenue recycling assumption, it is
possible to conﬁrm the employment second dividend in disaggregate terms
for North region.
d) Secondary distribution of income: nominal and real aspects
One of the reason making the environmental taxation proﬁtable is the possi-
bility to collect revenue and recycle it following diﬀerent criteria in order to
obtain welfare beneﬁts. This can be considered an ambitious intention but
14The model assumes the presence of Labour Union that bargains wages with Firms
maximising his utility function. The Union is neutral to the risk and has monopoly power.
This mean that when unemployment rate increase, the wage is sustained by the Union.
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Table 7: Impacts on Households and Firms nominal disposal income (%
change)
Institutional Sectors South North-Center
s1 s2 s1 s2
Households -0.036 -0.069 -0.101 -0.107
Firms -0.420 -0.402 -0.399 -0.369
Table 8: Impacts on Households and Firms real disposal income (% change)
Institutional Sectors South North-Center
s1 s2 s1 s2
Households -0.009 -0.400 0.149 -0.306
Firms -0.556 -0.527 -0.538 -0.495
it is realizable if we consider the results in disaggregate terms. In the ﬁrst
scenario s1 the environmental tax revenue distribution grants a cut of 4.63%
in Households income taxes but it does not generate positive results in terms
of nominal disposal income. As shown in the table 7, in both two regions
Households and Firms incomes decrease specially in North-Centre region,
probably as a consequence of the lower primary factors payments that re-
duce the Households and Firms endowments. A similar outcome emerges in
the second scenario s2 where the reduction of the regional tax on commodi-
ties value added aﬀects indirectly the nominal disposal income. Households
and Firms nominal incomes decrease more than in s1 as a result of the minor
primary factor remuneration.
In order to provide an evaluation of the policy in terms of Households and
Firms spending capacity, the results on the table 8 describes the percentage
changes in the real disposal income. Observing the results of simulation s1, it
comes out a lowering real income for Firms in both two regions and a growth
in disposable income for Households in North-Centre.
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Table 9: Impacts on Government balances (% change)
Institutional Sectors South North-Center
s1 s2 s1 s2
Regional Gov. -0.096 -0.397 -0.237 -0.819
District Gov. -0.114 -0.178 -0.276 -0.430
Municipal Gov. 1 -0.072 -0.131 -0.214 -0.285
Municipal Gov. 2 -0.097 -0.144 -0.246 -0.280
Municipal Gov. 3 -0.097 -0.141 -0.263 -0.284
Municipal Gov. 4 -0.086 -0.134 -0.272 -0.291
Municipal Gov. 5 -0.091 -0.141 -0.235 -0.280
s1 s2
Central Government 0.072 0.027
In the scenario s2, all real disposal incomes decrease especially in South
region: the reduction of the regional tax on commodities value added has
no positive eﬀects on private spending capacity. The change in real disposal
income can be evaluated as a further beneﬁt, a further dividend embodied
with the environmental policy. In this respect, if we consider the eﬀects of the
policy in disaggregate terms, we can accept the hypothesis of third dividend
represented by the higher income for Households in North-Centre region.
In relation to the private consumers disposable income, it is possible to
analyse the real income performance also for Government Institutional Sec-
tors. In particular we concentrate on Government expenditure capacity in
both two scenarios focusing on the distinction among Local and Central Gov-
ernment sectors. The table 9 describes a quite a little encouraging scenarios.
In both s1 and s2 Local Governments manifests a reduction in balances es-
pecially in North region. For the Central Government on the contrary, the
balance dimension increases in ﬁrst and second scenario.
e) Final demand phase
The ﬁnal demand generated by consumers completes the circular ﬂow of
income described by the simulations. The institutional sectors net income
is re-arranged in terms of ﬁnal demand according to the classiﬁcation of the
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commodities. The results illustrate a general reduction in ﬁnal demand in
disaggregate terms in each region for both scenarios.
5 Conclusions
The diﬀerent polluting power of production processes, expressed in terms of
CO2 emissions, justiﬁes the multi-sector approach and Input-Output anal-
ysis technique we used. The implementation of environmental satellite ac-
counts as NAMEA and SEEA which are seen as basic tool for the integration
between environmental and economic ﬂows, conﬁrms the validity of this ap-
proach. Economic impacts of any environmental policy in fact, must be
assessed in order to evaluate the proﬁtability of the policy and the beneﬁts
can be veriﬁed even in terms of disaggregate circular ﬂow of income. That
conﬁrm the adoption of an accounting scheme and disaggregate models along
the multisectoral analysis.
The analysis we propose in this paper derived from the implementation
of a well-detailed data base, which is characterised by the integration of envi-
ronmental data within economic ﬂows described in the SAM. This disaggre-
gated data base allowed to implement a Computational General Equilibrium
(CGE) model that is a suitable tool to evaluate the economic agents be-
haviour in the diﬀerent markets when an exogenous shock manifests. These
speciﬁc features of the multisectoral scheme make this approach suitable to
analyse the impacts of an environmental ﬁscal policy applied to an economic
system.
The ﬁrst step of our analysis (deﬁned ‘ex-ante’) refers to the determina-
tion of the tax base and the structure of the imposition. Disaggregated data
on emissions allowed to classify the production sector according to their pol-
luting capacity and permitted to model the proper environmental taxation
according to this classiﬁcation. The second step (deﬁned ‘ex-post’) concerns
the search of the environmental proﬁt (ﬁrst dividend) and the social-economic
beneﬁt (second dividend). These latter aspects can be analysed only with
a data base and a model oriented on the income circular ﬂow. In particu-
lar, this study aims to verify: the fall in CO2 emissions as ﬁrst dividend,
the reduction in unemployment rate as second dividend and the growth in
disposable income for institutional sectors as the third dividend.
As we showed the environmental tax was imposed on commodities output
in relation to the quantity of CO2 emissions embodied in their production
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process. The policy ﬁxes 5 classes of taxation: the ﬁrst class corresponds to
the no-tax area and the others admit a growing price per every ton of CO2
produced. The price in each class depends on the carbon quotation in brown
certiﬁcate market. In this respect it is possible to calculate average tax rate
for every commodity and simulate the environmental policy with regard to
proportional and progressive imposition structure.
This environmental policy was included in the Computational General
Equilibrium model that is built on the bi-regional SAM for Italy for 2003 in
order to verify and assess the existence of the double or triple dividend. For
this purpose two scenario are simulated: the ﬁrst refers to the destination of
the entire environmental tax revenue for the reduction of Households income
taxation, the second one concerns the recycle of the tax revenue to reduce
the regional tax on commodities value added.
The results veriﬁed the ﬁrst environmental dividend both in the econ-
omy as a whole and in disaggregate terms regardless of the diﬀerent type of
revenue distribution. Then we made an eﬀort to identify a second employ-
ment dividend represented by a reduction in unemployment rate in both two
scenarios. That was veriﬁed only in the North-Centre region, while South is
characterized by the growing of unemployment rates.
It was worth to put in evidence the impact of the policy implemented on
Private Institutional sectors disposable income especially when it is consid-
ered in real terms. When the policy maker used the tax revenue to reduce
income tax, a positive eﬀect on Households real income manifests but only in
North region. That can be interpreted as the third welfare dividend even if
it is assessed only in a single region and for a single private institutional sec-
tor. Thus if we concentrate on the major number of beneﬁts connected with
environmental policy, the distribution of the tax revenue by reducing income
taxes may be the better solution because it allows to reach a ﬁrst dividend
for the whole economy and second and third dividend in disaggregate terms.
The approach we adopted in the study of production process and environ-
mental issue, represents the preliminary attempt in the EDP determination.
The costs that the economic system has to eﬀort after the introduction of
an environmental tax, can be considered as the ﬁrst environmental oriented
revision of the GDP.
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